Contact and Coil | Nearly In Control

TAG | allen-bradley

Nov/15

1

Offline Changes to a PLC Program

As a PLC programmer, you’ll often be asked to do a change to an existing system. If there’s a significant amount of functionality to be added, you generally get your changes ready “offline” and then do all the changes during a short window of time to minimize disruption to the production schedule.

If you’re using an Allen-Bradley PLC, the procedure is typically this:

  1. Get a copy of the latest program from the PLC (a.k.a. an “upload”)
  2. Make your changes to the offline copy, and write down every change you had to make
  3. Go online with the PLC and apply your changes as online changes

Step 3 is much safer than just taking your modified program and doing a “download”. That’s mainly because when you download, you’re not just downloading the program, but the memory state of the PLC as well. The PLC typically has to track things in memory (like recipe data, part tracking, data collection, sequence numbers, machine counters, etc.). If you do a download, you’re going to overwrite all those values with previous values, and that can cause a lot of problems. The other thing step 3 saves you from is simultaneous changes that were done online while you were busy making offline changes.

The only other option you have is upload-change-download, but you really have to shut the machine down for the duration to make sure that the internal state doesn’t change.

When I did a lot of Allen-Bradley programming, I didn’t question that. It’s just how it was. I remember visiting a plant one time for a service call, and the local maintenance person was a bit suspicious of what I was going to do (after all, I was a young kid who had never seen this machine before). He decided to quiz me a bit, and one of the things he asked was, “when you go online, do you download or upload?” I said “it depends,” but his answer was, “you never download.” I agreed that someone in a maintenance role should never need to do a download unless they’re replacing a CPU, or recovering from a corrupted PLC program.

Now that I mostly do Beckhoff TwinCAT 3 programming, I realized one of the benefits are that offline changes are a breeze. It’s due to the fact that TwinCAT 3 completely separates the program from the memory data. The program is stored in local files on your hard drive and compiled into a TMC file. The persistent data is stored in a different place on your hard drive.

When I want to do offline changes to a TwinCAT 3 project, here’s the procedure:

  1. Get a copy of the latest program
  2. Make your changes to the offline copy
  3. Copy changes back to the machine (keeping a backup, of course), rebuild, and activate configuration

This makes offline changes go a lot more smoothly, of course. I don’t have to copy and paste my changes in while online, so it takes less time and eliminates the possibility of a copy/paste error.

Since we also use Mercurial for version control, getting a copy of the latest program is a matter of pulling the latest from the source control, and copying it to the machine is a matter of pulling the offline changes to the machine. Any changes that were done in parallel can be merged with Mercurial’s built-in diff and merge utilities. (Note: I/O changes can’t be merged nicely, so if someone changed the I/O while you were doing your offline changes, you have to copy those changes in manually, but that’s rare and at least it tells you that it can’t merge them.)

This got me thinking that Allen-Bradley probably has a better way of doing offline changes that most of us just don’t know about. I know that you can do an upload without uploading the memory. However, it seems like it requires you to download both the program and data at the same time. I wonder if anyone out there knows how to do better offline changes to a ControlLogix. If so, I would be interested to know that.

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Dec/10

31

Control System Security and 2010

Looking back at the year 2010, there was one really interesting and important happening in the world of industrial control system security: Stuxnet.

There’s a lot of speculation about this computer worm, but let’s just look at the facts:

  • It required substantially more resources to create than a typical computer worm (some estimates put it around $1,000,000, if you figure 5 person-years and the cost to employ specialized programmers)
  • It targets Siemens WinCC software, so that it can infect Step 7 PLCs
  • It looks like it was specifically targeted at a single facility (based on the fact that it was targeting a specific PLC, and only specific brands of VFDs)
  • It was designed to do real physical damage to equipment
  • It was designed to propagate via USB memory sticks to make it more likely to spread inside industrial settings, and even updated itself in a peer-to-peer manner (new versions brought in from the outside could update copies already inside a secure network)

If your average computer worm is the weapon-equivalent a hatchet, Stuxnet is a sniper rifle. There is speculation that the intended target was either the Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant or the Natanz Nuclear Facility, both in Iran, but what is known is that it has spread far and wide in other industrial networks. It’s been called the world’s first cyber super weapon.

What’s clear is that our industry’s relative ignorance when it comes to computer security has to end. Stuxnet proved the worst case, which is that a proprietary embedded PLC can successfully be the target of a computer worm.

I’ve been watching as more and more old-school vendors include Windows CE based devices as HMI components in their systems (like the PanelView Plus from Allen-Bradley). These are susceptible to the same kinds of threats that can infect Microsoft-based smartphones, and it takes a lot less than $1,000,000 to write one of those. It’s the kind some kid can put together in his basement for fun.

I’ve also seen (and even been pushing) a trend towards PC-based control. It’s nothing new, and I’ve seen PC-based control solutions out there for almost 10 years now, but it’s the networking that makes them vulnerable. In one facility about five years ago, I saw a PC-based control system completely taken down by a regular old computer worm. There were two mitigating causes in that case… first, the control system was on the same network as the main office network (the virus was brought in by an employee’s laptop that they connected at home), and secondly the vendor of the control software prohibited the customer from installing anti-virus software on the control system PC because they said it would void the warranty. I rarely see these same mistakes in new installations, but it does happen.

A couple of years ago I found a computer virus on an industrial PC with a VB6 application used as an HMI for a PLC/2. The PC in question was never connected to any network! The virus found its way to this computer over floppy disks and USB memory sticks.

Now if your facility is juicy enough that someone would spend $1,000,000 to take a shot at it, then you need specialized help. Stuxnet is a boon to security consultants because now they have a dramatic story to wave in the face of clients. On the other hand, most facilities need some kind of basic security measures.

  • Separate your industrial and office networks (if you need to move data from one to the other, then have a secure machine that can sit on both networks)
  • Make sure all machines automatically update their Windows Updates and their anti-virus definitions automatically, even if they’re on the industrial network
  • Change the default passwords on all devices and servers (including SQL Server’s SA password!)
  • Use different technologies in different layers (does your office network use Cisco managed switches? Consider using industrial managed switches from a different vendor in your industrial network)

Are you an integrator looking to expand your lines of business? Hire a computer security consultant and have them go knocking on the doors of your biggest customers with the Stuxnet story. You should be able to sell them a security assessment, and an action plan. Given the current security landscape, you’ll be doing them a big favour.

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Mar/10

13

The RSLogix 5000 Tutorial

I’ve decided to create a tutorial for beginners getting started with RSLogix 5000 from Rockwell Automation. Part 1 is already posted: Creating a New Project. I will be filling in the rest over the next few weeks. I hope new automation graduates and experienced members of the automation industry who are migrating from another platform will both find something useful.

As always, I welcome any and all constructive feedback.

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